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Abstract 
We present a propositional logic to reason about 
the uncertainty of events, where the uncertainty 
is modeled by a set of probability measures as­
signing an interval of probability to each event. 
We give a sound and complete axiomatization for 
the logic, and show that the satisfiability problem 
is NP-complete, no harder than satisfiability for 
propositional logic. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Various measures exist that attempt to quantify uncertainty. 
For many trained in the use of probability theory, probabil­
ity measures are an obvious choice. However, probability 
measures have difficulties dealing with certain situations of 
interest. For instance, while probabilities can model the 
direct uncertainty of an event happening, it is not always 
clear how to model higher-order uncertainty, that is, the un­
certainty related to the probabilities themselves. Consider 
a simple example: suppose we have a bag of 100 marbles; 
we know 30 are red and we know the remaining 70 are 
either blue or yellow, although we do not know the exact 
proportion of blue and yellow. If we are modeling the situ­
ation where we pick a ball from the bag at random, we need 
to assign a probability to three different events: picking up 
a red ball (red-event), picking up a blue ball (blue-event), 
and picking up a yellow ball (yellow-event). We can clearly 
assign a probability of .3 to red-event, but there is no clear 
probability to assign to blue-event or yellow-event. 
One way to approach this problem is to represent the un­
certainty using a set of probability measures, with a prob­
ability measure for each possible proportion of blue and 
yellow balls. For instance, we could use the set of proba­
bilities P = {t.to: : a E [0, .7]}, where tla gives red-event 
probability .3, blue-event probability a, and yellow-event 
probability . 7 - a. To any set of probabilities P we can 
assign a pair of functions, the upper and lower probability 
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measure, that for an event X give the supremum (respec­
tively, the infimum) of the probability of X according to the 
probability measures in P. These measures can be used to 
deal with uncertainty in the manner described above, where 
the lower and upper probability of an event defines a range 
of probability for that event.1 Note that this is not the only 
way to model the situation. An alternative approach, using 
inner measures, is studied in [Fagin and Halpern 1991]. 
Given a measure of uncertainty, one can define a logic for 
reasoning about it. Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo [1990] 
introduce a logic for reasoning about probabilities, with a 
possible-worlds semantics that assigns a probability to each 
possible world. They provide an axiomatization for the log­
ic, which they prove sound and complete with respect to the 
semantics. They also show that the satisfiability problem 
for the logic, somewhat surprisingly, is NP-complete, and 
hence no harder than the satisfiability problem for propo­
sitional logic. They moreover show how their logic can 
be extended to other notions of uncertainty, such as inner 
measures [Fagin and Halpern 1991] and Dempster-Shafer 
belief functions [Shafer 1976]. 
In this paper, we describe a logic for reasoning about up­
per probability measures, along the lines of the logic intro­
duced in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990]. The main 
challenge is to derive a provably complete axiomatization 
of the logic; to do this, we need a characterization of up­
per probability measures in terms of properties that can be 
expressed in the logic. Many semantic characterizations of 
upper probability measures have been proposed in the liter­
ature. The characterization of Anger and Lembcke [1985] 
turns out to be best suited for our purposes. Even though 
we are reasoning about potentially infinite sets of probabili­
ty measures, the satisfiability problem for our logic remains 
NP-complete. Intuitively, we need guess only a small num­
ber of probability measures to satisfY any given formula, 
1 An alternate view of upper probabilities originates from as­
signing subjective probabilities to events by testing and finding at 
what odds a person is prepared to bet against them. This gives 
rise, given suitable assumptions, to an equivalent formulation of 
lower and upper probability measures [Smith 1961; Walley 1991]. 
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polynomially many in the size of the formula. Moreover, 
these probability measures can be taken to be defined on a 
finite state space , again polynomial in the size of the for­
mula. Thus, we need to basically determine polynomially 
many values-a value for each probability measure at each 
state-to decide the satisfiability of a formula. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 
2, we review the required material from probability theo­
ry and the theory of upper probabilities. In Section 3, we 
present the logic and an axiomatization. In Section 4, we 
prove that the axiomatization is sound and complete with 
respect to the natural semantic models expressed in terms 
of upper probability spaces. Finally, in Section 5, we prove 
that the decision problem for the logic is NP-complete. We 
leave out the proofs of the more technical results. These 
can be found in the full version of the paper [Halpern and 
Pucella 2001]. 
2 CHARACTERIZI NG UPPER 
PROBABILITY MEASURES 
We start with a brief review of the relevant definitions. Re­
call that a probability measure is a function f.L : :E ---+ [0, 1] 
for :E an algebra of subsets of n (that is :E is closed under 
complements and unions), satisfying f.L(0) = 0, f.L(D) = 1 
and f.L(A U B) = f.L(A) + f.L(B) for all disjoint sets A, B in 
:E. 2 A probability space is a tuple (D, E, f.L), where !1 is a 
set, :E is an algebra of subsets of D (the measurable sets), 
and f.L is a probability measure defined on :E. Given a set 
P of probability measures, let P* be the upper probability 
measure3 defined by P* (X) = sup{f.L(X) : f.L E P} for 
X E :E. Similarly, P*(X) = inf{f.L(X) : f.L E P} is the 
lower probability of X E :E. A straightforward derivation 
shows that the relationship P*(X) = 1- P*(X) holds be­
tween upper and lower probabilities, where X is the com­
plement of X in D. Because of this duality, we restrict the 
discussion to upper probability measures in this paper, with 
the understanding that results for lower probabilities can be 
similarly derived. Finally, an upper probability space is a 
tuple (0, :E, P) where Pis a set of probability measures on 
E. 
2If O; is infinite, we could also require that I: be a (1-algebra 
(i.e., closed under countable unions) and that J-1. be countably addi­
tive. Requiring countable additivity would not affect our results, 
since we show that we can take !1 to be finite. For ease of exposi­
tion, we have not required it. 
3In the literature, the term upper probability is sometimes used 
in a more restricted sense than here. For example, Dempster 
[1967] uses the term to denote a class of measures which were 
later characterized as Dempster-Shafer belief functions [Shafer 
1976]; belief functions are in fact upper probability measures in 
our sense, but the converse is not true [Kyburg 1987]. In the mea­
sure theory literature, what we call upper probability measures 
are a special case of upper envelopes of measures, which are de­
fined as the sup of sets of general measures, not just probability 
measures. 
We would like a set of properties that completely character­
izes upper probability measures. In other words, we would 
like a set of properties that allow us to determine if a func­
tion f : :E ---+ [0, 1] (for an algebra :E of subsets of D) is 
an upper probability measure, that is, whether there exists 
a set P of probability measures such that for all X E �. 
P* (X) = f(X). 
One approach to the characterization of upper probabili­
ty measures is to adapt the characterization of Dempster­
Shafer belief functions; these functions are known to be 
the lower envelope of the probability measures that domi­
nate them, and thus form a subclass of the class of lower 
probability measures. By the duality noted earlier, a char­
acterization of lower probability measures would yield a 
characterization of upper probability measures. The char­
acterization of belief functions is derived from a general­
ization of the following inclusion-exclusion principle for 
probabilities (by replacing the equality with an inequality): 
n n 
i=l i=l J(;;{l, ... ,n} jEJ 
IJI=i 
It seems reasonable that a characterization of lower (or up­
per) probability measures could be derived along similar 
lines. As we now show, most properties derivable from 
the inclusion-exclusion principle (which include most of 
the properties reported in the literature) are insufficient to 
characterize upper probability measures. 
Consider the following "inclusion-exclusion"-style prop­
erties (mainly taken from [Walley 1991]). To simplify the 
statement of these properties , let p-l = P* and p+l 
= 
P*. 
(I) P * (Al u . . · u An) S 
:L�=l Ljli=J -l)i+lp(-l)' cnJ.El Aj). 
(3) P.(A U B) +  P.(A n B) S P .. (A) + P*(B) S 
P*(A U B) + P*(A n B), 
(4) P*(A) + P*(B) S P.(A U B)+ P*(A n B)$ 
P*(A) + P*(B) , 
(5) P.(A) + P* (B ) S P.(A n B)+ P* (A U B) $  
P*(A) + P*(B). 
It is easily verified that the above properties hold f or upper 
probability measures. The issue is whether they complete­
ly characterize the class of upper probability measures. We 
show the inherent incompleteness of these properties by 
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proving that they are all derivable from the following sim­
ple property, which is by itself insufficient to characterize 
upper probability measures. 
(6) If AnB = 0, then P*(A) +P.(B):::; P*(AUB):::; 
P*(A) + P*(B). 
Proposition 2.1: Property (6) implies properties (1)-(5). 
The following example shows the inusfficiency of Propo­
erty (6). Let P be the set of probability measures 
{tLt. 112,/13, 1-14} over n = {a, b, c, d} (with L: containing 
all subsets off!) defined on singletons by: 
1-lt(a)=i 1-lt(b)=t /11(c)=t 1-lt(d)=t 
112(a) = 0 1-12(b) = k 1-12(c) = � 1-12(d) = � 
1-ls(a) =! l-l3(b) = � l-l3(c) = 0 l-l3(d) = � 
l-l4(a) = � l-l4(b) = 0 /14(c) = ! {14(d) = � 
and extended by additivity to all ofL:. This defines an upper 
probability measure P* over 1:. Consider the function Ve : 
E --+ [0, 1] defined by: 
(X)= 
( P*(X)+t: ifX={a,b,c} v, P*(X) otherwise 
We claim that the function V0 for small enough f > 0, 
satisfies property ( 6), but cannot be an upper probability 
measure. 
Proposition 2.2: For 0 < f < !· the function v, satisfies 
property (6), but is not an upper probability measure. That 
is, we cannot find a set P' of probability measures such that 
v, = (P')*. 
This example clearly illustrates the need to go beyond the 
inclusion-exclusion principle to find properties that charac­
terize upper probability measures. As it turns out, various 
complete characterizations have been described in the lit­
erature [Lorentz 1952; Huber 1976; Huber 1981; Williams 
1976; Wolf 1977; Giles 1982; Anger and Lembcke 1985]. 
While all are equivalent in spirit, we focus on the charac­
terization given by Anger and Lembcke [1985], because it 
is particularly well-suited to the logic presented in the next 
section. The characterization is based on the notion of set 
cover: a set A is said to be covered n times by a multiset 
{{A 1, . . . , Am}} of sets if every element of A appears in at 
least n sets from A 1, ... , Am: for all x E A, there exists 
i 1. . . . , in in { 1, .. . , m} such that for all j :::; n, x E A; j • 
It is important to note here that {{A1, • • •  , Am}} is a multi­
set, not a set; the A; 's are not necessarily distinct. (We use 
the {{ }}notation to denote multisets.) An (n, k)-cover of 
(A, n) is a multiset {{A1, . .. , Am}} that covers n k times 
and covers A n + k times. 
The notion of (n, k)-cover is the key concept in Anger and 
Lembcke's characterization of upper probability measures. 
Theorem 2.3:[Anger and Lembcke 1985] Let n be a set, E 
an algebra of subsets ofrl, and v a function v : E--+ [0, 1]. 
There exists a set P of probability measures with v = p• 
if and only if v satisfies the following three properties: 
UPl. v(0) = 0, 
UP2. v(r!) = 1, 
UP3. for all integers m, n, k and all subsets 
A1, ... , Am in L:, if {{At, ... , Am}} is an 
(n, k)-cover of (A, r!), then k + nv(A) < 
L:Z:,1 v(A;). 
We need to strengthen Theorem 2.3 in order to prove the 
main result of this paper, namely, the completeness of the 
axiomatization of the logic we introduce in the next section. 
We show that if the cardinality of the state space n is finite, 
then we need only finitely many instances of property UP3. 
Notice that we cannot derive this from Theorem 2.3 alone: 
even if 101 is finite, UP3 does not provide any bound on m, 
the number of sets to consider in an ( n, k) cover of a set A. 
Indeed, there does not seem to be any a priori reason why 
the value of m, n, and k can be bounded. Bounding this 
value ofm (and hence ofn and k, since they are no larger 
than m) is the one of the key technical results of this paper, 
and the necessary foundation of our work. 
Theorem 2.4: There exists constants B0, Bt, .. . such that 
if E is an algebra of subsets of[! and v is a jUnction 
v : L: --+ [0, 1], then there exists a set P of probability 
measures such that v = P* if and only if v satisfies the 
following properties: 
UPFl. v(0) 
= 
0, 
UPF2. v(r!) = 1, 
UPF3. for all integers m, n, k :::; B1n1 and all 
sets A1, ... , Am. if {{A1, . . , Am}} is an 
(n, k)-cover of (A, r!), then k + nv(A) :::; 
2:: 1 v(Ai)· 
Property UPF3 is significantly weaker than UP3. In princi­
ple, checking that UP3 holds for a given function requires 
checking that it holds for arbitrarily large collections of set­
s, even if the underlying set [! is finite. On the other hand, 
UPF3 guarantees that it is in fact sufficient to look at col­
lections of size at most Bini· This observation is key to the 
completeness result. 
It is not important for our purposes (namely to get com­
pleteness of the axiomatization of the logic introduced in 
the next section) what the actual values of B0, B1, . . . are; 
it is sufficient for them to exist and be finite. The proof 
of Theorem 2.4 relies on a Ramsey-theoretic argument that 
does not provide a bound on the B;s. 
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3 THELOGI C 
The syntax for the logic is straightforward, and is taken 
from [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990]. We fix a set 
<I> a = {P1, P2, .. . } of primitive propositions. The set II> of 
propositional formulas is the closure of <I>0 under 1\ and '· 
We assume a special propositional formula true, and abbre­
via te ..,true as false. We use p to represent primitive propo­
sitions, and 'P and 1/J to represent propositional formulas. A 
term is an expression of the form 81l('Pd + · · · + Bkl('Pk), 
where Bt. ... , Bk are reals and k � 1. A basic likelihood 
formula is a statement of the form t 2: a, where t is a 
term and a is a real. A likelihood formula is a boolean 
combination of basic likelihood formulas. We use f and 
g to represent likelihood formulas. We use obvious ab­
breviations where needed, such as l ( 'P) - l ( 1/J) � a for 
l('P) + ( -l)l('I/J) � a, l('P) � l('I/J) for l('P)- l('I/J) � 0, 
l('P) ::; a for -l('P) � -a, l('P) < a  for ...,(l('P) �a) and 
l('P) = a for (l('P) � a) 1\ (l('P) ::; a) . Define the length 
If I of the likelihood formula f to be the number of sym­
bols required to write J, where each coefficient is counted 
as one symbol. 
We assign a semantics to likelihood formulas through an 
upper probability space, as defined in Section 2. For­
mally, an upper probability structure is a tuple M = 
(Sl, 2:, P, 1r) where (Sl, :E, P) is an upper probability s­
pace and 1r associates with each state (or world) in Sl a 
truth assignment on the primitive propositions in "'>o. Thus, 
1r(s)(p) E {true, false} for s E Sl and p E "'>a. Let 
[p]M = {s E n : 1r(s)(p) = true}. We call M mea­
surable if for each p E "'>o, [p]M is measurable. If M is 
measurable then [ 'P] M is measurable for all proposition­
al formulas 'P· In this paper, we restrict our attention to 
measurable upper probability structures. Extend 1r( s) to a 
truth assignment on all propositional formulas in a standard 
way, and associate with each propositional formula the set 
['P]M = {s E Sl : 1r(s)('[J) = true}. An easy struc­
tural induction shows that ['P]M is a measurable set. If 
M = (D, E, P, 1r), let 
M F= B1l('P1) + · · · + Bkl('Pk) � a  iff 
81P*(['PdM) + · · · + BkP*(['Pk]M) �a 
M F -,j iff M � f 
M f= f 1\ g iff M F f and M f= g. 
Note that the logic can express lower probabilities: it fol­
lows from the duality between upper and lower probabili­
ties that M f= -l( ''P) 2: {3- 1 iffP*([-,'P]M) � {3.4 
Consider the following axiomatization AXttP for likelihood 
formulas, which we prove sound and complete in the next 
4 Another approach, more in keeping with [Fagin, Halpern, and 
Megiddo 1990], would be to interpret l as a lower probability 
measure. On the other hand, interpreting l as an upper probability 
measure is more in keeping with the literature on upper probabil­
ities. 
section. As in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990], AXup 
is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with propo­
sitional reasoning, reasoning about linear inequalities, and 
reasoning about upper probabilities. 
Propositional reasoning 
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies, 
MP. From f and f =:::;. g infer g. 
Reasoning about linear inequalities 
Ineq. All instances of valid formulas about linear in­
equalities (see below). 
Reasoning about upper probabilities 
Ll. l(false) = 0, 
L2. l(true) = 1, 
L3. l('P) � 0, 
L4. l('Pl) + · · · + l('Pm)- nl(cp) � kif 
cp:::;. V J£:;{1, ... ,m}, IJI=k+n 1\jEJ 'Pi and 
V J�{l, ... ,m} , IJI=k /\jEJ 'PJ are propositional tau­
tologies. 
LS. l ( cp) = l ( 1/J) if 'P -<=} 1/J is a propositional tautolo­
gy. 
The only difference between AXttP and the axiomati­
zation for reasoning about probability given in [Fagin, 
Halpern, and Megiddo 1990] is that the axiom l('P 1\ 
'ljJ) + l ( 'P 1\ -,'lj;) = l ( 'P) in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megid­
do 1990], which expresses the additivity of probability, 
is replaced by L4. Although it may not be immediate­
ly obvious, L4 is the logical analogue of UPJ. To see 
this, first note that {{At. . .. , Am}} covers A m times 
if and only if A � U1�{1, . .. ,m}, IJI=n njEJ AJ· Thus, 
the formula cp :::;. V J�{1, . . ,m}, IJI=k+n 1\JEJ 'PJ says 
that 'P (more precisely, the set of worlds where cp is 
true) is covered k + n times by {{cp�, .. . ,cpn}}, while 
V J£:;{1, ... ,.m} , IJI=k /\JEJ 'PJ says that the whole space is 
covered k times by {{ '{)1, ... , 'Pn}}; roughly speaking, 
{{[cpl], ... , [cpn]}} is an (n, k)-cover of(['fJ], [true]). The 
conclusion of L4 thus corresponds to the conclusion of 
UP3. 
Instances ofTaut include all formulas of the form f V ...,/, 
where f is a likelihood formula. We could replace Taut by 
a simple collection of axioms that characterize proposition­
al reasoning (see, for example, [Mendelson 1964]), but we 
have chosen to focus on aspects of reasoning about upper 
probability. 
As in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990], the axiom In­
eq includes "all valid formulas about linear inequalities." 
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Roughly speaking, an inequality formula is a formula of the 
form aiXI + · · · + anXn ;::: c, over variables Xt, ... , Xn. 
The formula is said to be true if we satisfy the resulting 
inequality when we assign a real number to each variable 
of the formula. As usual, a formula is valid if it is true 
under every possible assignment of real numbers to vari­
ables. To get an instance of Ineq, we replace each variable 
x; that occurs in a valid formula about linear inequalities 
by a primitive likelihood term of the form l( 'Pd (naturally 
each occurence of the variable x; must be replaced by the 
same primitive likelihood term l(tp;)). As with Taut, we 
can replace Ineq by a sound and complete axiomatization 
for boolean combinations of linear inequalities. One such 
axiomatization is given in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 
1990]. 
4 SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS 
A likelihood formula f is provable from F for F a set of 
formulas if it can be proven using the axioms and rules 
of inferences, along with the formulas in F. In the spe­
cial case where F is empty, we say that f is simply prov­
able. An axiom system is sound if every provable formula 
is valid. An axiom system is complete if every valid formu­
la is provable. 
Our goal is to prove that AXup is a sound and complete 
axiomatization for reasoning about upper probability. The 
soundness of AXup is immediate from our earlier disscus­
sion. Completeness is, as usual, harder. Unfortunately, the 
standard technique for proving completeness in modal log­
ic, which involves considering maximal consistent sets and 
canonical structures (see, for example, [Popkom 1994]) 
does not work. We briefly review the approach, just to point 
out the difficulties. 
The standard approach uses the following definitions. A 
formula cr is consistent with an axiom system AX if 
-.a is not provable from AX. A finite set of formulas 
{ cri, .. . , an} is consistent with AX if the formula ai 1\ 
· · · /\ ern is consistent with AX; an infinite set of formulas 
is consistent with AX if all its finite subsets are consistent 
with AX. A maximal AX-consistent set of formulas F is a 
set of formulas consistent with AX with the property that 
for any formula cr ¢ F, F U {a} is not consistent with AX. 
Using just axioms of propositional logic, it is not hard to 
show that a AX-consistent set of formulas can be extended 
to a maximal AX-consistent set of formulas. To show that 
AX is a complete axiomatization with respect to some class 
of structures M, we must show that every formula that is 
valid in every structure in M is provable in AX. To do this, 
it is sufficient to show that every AX-consistent formula cr 
is satisfiable in M. Typically, this is done by constructing 
what is called a canonical structure Me in M whose states 
are the maximal AX-consistent sets, and then showing that 
a formula cr is satisfied in a world w in Me iff cr is one of 
the formulas in the canonical set associated with world w. 
Unfortunately, this approach cannot be used to prove com­
pleteness here. To see this, consider the set of formulas; 
F' = {l(<p) � _!., n = 1, 2, ... } U {l(<p) > 0}. 
n 
This set is clearly AXuP_consistent according to our def­
inition, since every finite subset is satisfiable and AXup 
is sound. It thus can be extended to a maximal AXup_ 
consistent set F. However, the set F' of formulas is not 
satisfiable: it is not possible to assign l ( 'P) a value that will 
satisfy all the formulas at the same time. Hence, F is not 
satisfiable. Thus, the canonical model approach, at least 
applied naively, simply will not work. 
We take a different approach here, similar to the one tak­
en in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990]. Specifically, 
we show that if a formula f is AXuP-consistent, then it 
is satisfiable in an upper probability structure. By a sim­
ple argument, we can easily reduce the problem to the case 
where f is a conjunction of basic likelihood formulas and 
negations of basic likelihood formulas. Let Pl, ... , p N 
be the primitive propositions that appear in f. Observe 
that there are 22N inequivalent propositional formulas over 
PI, ... , p N. The argument goes as follow. Let an atom 
over p1, ... ,PN be a formula of the form QI 1\ .. . 1\ qN, 
where q; is either p; or -.p;. There are clearly 2N atoms 
over PI, .. . , p N. Moreover, it is easy to see that any for­
mula over p1, . .. , p N can be written in a unique way as a N 
disjunction of atoms. There are 22 such disjunctions, so 
the claim follows. 
Let p1, • • •  , p22N be some canonical listing of the inequiv­
alent formulas over PI, ... ,PN· Without loss of general­
ity, we assume that p1 is equivalent to true, and p22N is 
equivalent to false. Since every propositional formula over 
PI, ... , p N is provably equivalent to some p, it follows that 
f is provably equivalent to a formula f' where each con­
junct Of j1 iS Of the form eil(pi) + • · · + e22Nl(p22N) 2: 
{3. Note that the negation of such a formula has the for­
m ell(pi) + • • •  + e22Nl(p22N) < {3 Or, equivalently, 
( -ei)l(pl) + · · · + ( -e22N )l(p22N) > -{3. Thus, the 
formula f gives rise in a natural way to a system of in­
equalities of the form: 
e1,1l(pt) + ... + ei,22N L(p22N) > ai 
Or,Il(pi) + ... + er,22Nl(p22N) > O'r 
e�,1l(pi) + ... + e�,22N l(p22N) > {31 ( 1) 
We can express (I) as a conjunction of inequality formulas, 
by replacing each occurrence of l(p;) in (I) by x;. Call this 
inequality formula ]. 
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If f is satisfiable in some upper probability structure M, 
then we can take x; to be the upper probability of p; in M; 
this gives a solution of]. However, 7 may have a solution 
without f being satisfiable. For example, iff is the formula 
l (p) = 1/2 i\ l ( •P) = 0, then 7 has an obvious solution; f, 
however, is not satisfiable in an upper probability structure, 
because the upper probability of the set corresponding to 
p and the upper probability of the set corresponding to •p 
must sum to at least 1 in all upper probability structures. 
Thus, we must add further constraints to the solution to 
force it to act like an upper probability. 
UP1-UP3 or, equivalently, the axioms Ll-L4, describe 
exactly what additional constraints are needed. The con­
straint corresponding toLl (or UPl) is just x1 = 0, since 
we have assumed PI is the formula false. Similarly, the 
constraint corresponding to L2 is x22N = 1. The constraint 
corresponding to L3 is x; ;::: 0, fori = 1, .. . , 22N. What 
about L4? This seems to require an infinite collection of 
constraints, just as UP3 does. 5 
This is where UPF3 comes into play. It turns out that, if 
f is satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a structure with at 
most2N worlds, one for each atom overp11 • . .  ,PN· Thus, 
we need to add only instances ofL4 where k, m, n < B2N 
and tf!l, • • . , 'Pm, rp are all among PI, . .. , p22N • Although 
this is a large number of formulas (in fact, we do not know 
exactly how large, since it depends on B2N, which we have 
not computed), it suffices for our purposes that it is a fi­
nite number. For each of these instances ofL4, there is an 
inequality of the form a1 x1 + · · · + a22N x22N 2:: k. Let 
], the inequality formula corresponding to f, be the con­
junction consisting of f, together with all the inequalities 
corresponding to the relevant instances of L4, and the e­
quations and inequalitites x1 = 0, x22N = 1, and X; 2:: 0 
fori = 1, ... , 22N , corresponding to axioms Ll-L3. 
Proposition 4.1: The formula f is satisfiable in an upper 
probability structure if! the inequality formula j has a so­
lution. Moreover, iff has a solution, then f is satisfiable 
in an upper probability structure with at most 21 1 worlds. 
Theorem 4.2: The axiom system AX"P is sound and com­
plete for upper probability structures. 
Proof: For soundness, it is easy to see that every axiom is 
valid for upper probability structures, including L4, which 
represents UP3. 
For completeness, we proceed as in the discussion above. 
Assume that formula f is not satisfiable in an upper proba­
bility structure; we must show that f is AX"P-inconsistent. 
We first reduce f to a canonical form. Let 91 V · · · V 9r be a 
�Although we are dealing with only finitely many formulas 
here, PI, .. . , p22N , recall that the formulas 'Pl, .. . , 'Pm. in L4 
need not be distinct, so there are potentially infinitely many in· 
stances ofL4 to deal with. 
disjunctive normal form expression for f (where each g; is 
a conjunction of basic likelihood formulas and their nega­
tions). Using propositional reasoning, we can show that f 
is provably equivalent to this disjunction. Since f is UTI­
satisfiable, each 9i must also be unsatisfiable. Thus, it is 
sufficient to show that any unsatisfiable conjunction of ba­
sic likelihood formulas and their negations is inconsistent. 
Assume that f is such a conjunction. Using proposition­
al reasoning and axiom L5, f is equivalent to a likelihood 
formula f' that refers to formulas PI, ... , p22N. Since f 
is unsatisfiable, so is f'. By Proposition 4.1, the the in­
equality formula ]' corresponding to f' has no solution. 
Thus, by lneq, the formula -,f" that results by replacing 
each instance of Xi in ]'by l(pi) is AX"P-provab1e. All 
the conjuncts off" that are instances of axioms Ll-L4 are 
AX"P-provable. It follows that •!' is AXuP_provable, and 
hence so is -,f. I 
5 DECISION PR O CEDURE 
Having settled the issue of the soundness and completeness 
of the axiom system AX"P, we turn to the problem of the 
complexity of deciding satisfiability. Recall the problem 
of satisfiability: given a likelihood formula f, we want to 
determine if there exists an upper probability structure M 
such that M � f. As we now show, the satisfiability prob­
lem is NP-complete, and thus no harder than satisfiability 
for propositional logic. 
For the decision problem to make sense, we need to restrict 
our language slightly. If we allow real numbers as coeffi­
cients in likelihood formulas, we have to carefully discuss 
the issue of representation of such numbers. To avoid these 
complications, we restrict our language to allow only inte­
ger coefficients. Note that we can still express rational co­
efficients by the standard trick of "clearing the denomina­
tor". For example, we can express iZ ( cp) 2:: 1 by 2l ( rp) 2 3 
and l(rp) 2:: i by 3l(cp) 2:: 2. Recall that we defined 1!1 to 
be the length of f, that is, the number of symbols required 
to write f, where each coefficient is counted as one sym­
bol. Define II f II to be the length of the longest coefficient 
appearing in f, when written in binary. The size of a ratio­
nal number�. denoted 11�11, where a and bare relatively 
prime, is defined to be llall + llbll· 
A preliminary result required for the analysis of the de­
cision procedure shows that if a formula is satisfied in 
some upper probability structure, it is satisfied in a struc­
ture (D, :E., P, 1r), which is "small" in terms of the number 
of states in n, the cardinality of the set P of probability 
measures, and the size of the coefficients in f. 
Theorem 5.1: Suppose f is a likelihood formula that is sat­
isfied in some upper probability structure. Then f is satis­
fied in a structure (0, :E., P, 1r ), where IDI :S: 1!12, :E. = 2° 
(every subset set ofO is measurable), IPI :S: IJI, J-L(w) 
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is a rational number such that llti(w)!l is O(Jfi2IIJII + 
IJJ2log(J/J)) for every world w E n and J-L E P, and 
1r( w) (p) =false for every world w E n and every primi­
tive proposition p not appearing in f. 
Theorem 5.2: The problem of deciding whether a likeli­
hood formula is satisfiable in an upper probability struc­
ture is NP-complete. 
Proof: For the lower bound, it is clear that a given propo­
sitional formula rp is satisfiable iff the likelihood formula 
l ( rp) > 0 is satisfiable, therefore the satisfiability prob­
lem is NP-hard. For the upper bound, given a likeli­
hood formula f, we guess a "small" satisfying structure 
M = (0, I:, P, 1r) for f of the form guaranteed to ex­
ist by Theorem 5.1. We verify that M f= f as fol­
lows. Let l ( 1j;) be an arbitrary likelihood term in f. We 
compute [1/l]M by checking the truth assignment of each 
s E 0 and seeing whether this truth assignment makes 
1j; true. We then replace each occurence of l( 1j;) in f by 
max'"E'P{LsES., J-L(s)} and verify that the resulting ex­
pression is true. I 
6 CONCLUSION 
We have considered a logic with the same syntax as the 
logic for reasoning about probability, inner measures, and 
belief presented in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990], 
with uncertainty interpreted as the upper probability of a 
set of probability measures. Under this interpretation, we 
have provided a sound and complete axiomatization for the 
logic. We further showed that the satisfiability problem 
is NP -complete (as it is for reasoning about probability, 
inner measures, and beliefs [Fagin, Halpern, and Megid­
do 1990]), despite having to deal with probability struc­
tures with possibility infinitely many states and infinite sets 
of probability measures. The key step in the axiomatiza­
tion involves finding a characterization of upper probabili­
ty measures that can be captured in the logic. The key step 
in the complexity result involves showing that if a formula 
was satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a "small" structure, 
where the size of the state space as well as the size of the 
set of probability measures and the size of all probabilities 
involved, is polynomial in the length of the formula. 
Given the similarity in spirit of the results for the various 
interpretations of the uncertainty operator (as a probability, 
inner measure, belief function, and upper probability), we 
conjecture that there is some underlying result from which 
all these results should follow. It would be interesting to 
make that precise. 
An interesting generalization of the class of logics we have 
been discussing, namely logics with an uncertainty opera­
tor interpreted variously as a probability, an inner measure, 
a belief function, or an upper probability, is to consider ex-
pectations (or gambles). One can design a logic with an 
expectation operator instead of a likelihood operator, and 
again interpret the operator variously, as the expectation of 
a probability, an inner measure, a belief function, or an up­
per probability. (The work of Wilson and Moral [1994] is 
along those lines.) One advantage of working with expec­
tation functions is that they are typically easier to charac­
terize than the corresponding measures; for instance, the 
characterization of upper probabilities of gambles is much 
simpler than that of upper probabilities of events [Walley 
1991]. Moreover, expectation functions lead in general to 
more expressive logics. We plan to report on this line of 
investigation in future work. 
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